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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE CITY,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

:

STEVEN DAVIDSON,

:

Case No. 981508-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
Whether the District Court erred in denying Defendant's
Motion to Suppress on the ground that the challenged search was
justified by the medical emergency exception to the warrant
requirement when: (i) the Defendant was not in need of medical
assistance at the time of the search; (ii) the District Court
found that the search was partially motivated by the officer's
incorrect belief that he was conducting a search incident to a
lawful arrest; and (iii) the District Court concluded that the
officer lacked probable cause to conduct the search?
Standard of Review:

The District Court's conclusions of law

in denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress are reviewed
nondeferentially for correctness.
1229, 1232 (Utah 1996).

State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d

The factual findings underlying that

denial are reviewed under the deferential "clearly erroneous"
standard.

Id.

Where specific findings are required, the

District Court's failure to enter such findings is reversible

error and generally requires that the case be remanded for the
District Court to make additional findings.

Flying Diamond Oil

Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 1989).
However, remand for additional findings is not necessary if the
evidence in the record is not in dispute and the appellate court
can fairly and properly resolve the case on the record before it.
World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 262
(Utah 1994).
Preservation Below:

This issue was preserved below at

R. 6-7, 88-93.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are of central importance to this
appeal:
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(i)
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea
of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest,
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of
any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the
plea.
U.S. Const./ Amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/Appellant Steven Davidson appeals his conviction
of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.
2

Mr. Davidson was originally charged in the Third District Court
with possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana,
and furnishing false information to a police officer.

R. 1.

Mr. Davidson subsequently moved the District Court to suppress
the marijuana and paraphernalia on the ground that they were
discovered as the result of an unconstitutional search of
Mr. Davidson's person.

R. 6-7.

After hearing evidence and

arguments, the District Court, Judge Michael L. Hutchings, denied
Mr. Davidson's motion.

R. 9, 94.

Mr. Davidson then pleaded

guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving his right
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress and to withdraw
his guilty plea if successful on appeal.

R. 46, 48.

See Utah R.

Crim. P. 11 (i); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The other two charges against Mr. Davidson were dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 11, 1998 at approximately 9:30 p.m., Salt Lake City
Police Officer Alton Hedenstrom was dispatched to 1129 East Third
Avenue on a report of a possible heroin overdose.

R. 69-70.

By

the time he arrived at the scene, paramedics had already arrived
and were attending to an unconscious man lying face up in the
kitchen.

R. 70.

Upon entering the house, Officer Hedenstrom

also observed several firefighters and another individual he
later identified as Steven Davidson.

R. 70.

When Officer Hedenstrom walked into the kitchen, the
paramedics asked him to take Mr. Davidson into another room.
R. 71.

Officer Hedenstrom and Mr. Davidson then walked into the
3

living room where Mr. Davidson sat down on the couch.

R. 71.

Mr. Davidson identified himself to Officer Hedenstrom and
provided his date of birth.

R. 71, 78.

However, when Officer

Hedenstrom asked Mr. Davidson for his address, Mr. Davidson would
only say that he did not live at the house they were in.

R. 71.

Officer Hedenstrom then asked if the unconscious man lived in the
house.

Mr. Davidson answered, "No, he didn't live there either."

R. 72.
According to Officer Hedenstrom, the paramedics were still
working on the unconscious man in the kitchen at this time.
R. 72.

While Officer Hedenstrom was still trying to find out

where Mr. Davidson lived, one of the paramedics hollered to him
to ask Mr. Davidson what drug the unconscious man had taken.
R. 72.

Officer Hedenstrom testified that Mr. Davidson refused to

provide any information about drugs or drug paraphernalia.
R. 72-73.
Officer Hedenstrom then placed Mr. Davidson under arrest,
handcuffed him, and searched him.

R. 74.

At the suppression

hearing, Officer Hedenstrom testified that he searched
Mr. Davidson because "It's a standard procedure when someone is
arrested to search them for weapons and anything else.

I was

hoping to find the drug paraphernalia that this man had overdosed
on that could help him."

R. 74.

Although Officer Hedenstrom did

not find the drugs or paraphernalia the unconscious man had used,
he did find marijuana and a marijuana pipe.

R. 74.

Mr. Davidson was subsequently charged with possession of
4

marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and furnishing false
information to a police officer.1

Mr. Davidson moved to

suppress the marijuana and drug paraphernalia, arguing that they
were discovered as the result of an unconstitutional search.
R. 6-7.

Specifically, Mr. Davidson argued that the search could

not be justified as a search incident to his arrest because
Officer Hedenstrom did not have probable cause to believe that
Mr. Davidson had committed a crime at the time he was arrested
and searched.

R. 87.

Although the District Court agreed that

Officer Hedenstrom did not have probable cause to arrest
Mr. Davidson prior to the search, the court concluded that the
search could be justified under the medical emergency exception
to the warrant requirement.

R. 92-94.

In reaching this

conclusion, the District Court found:
In this case, the officers motivation and the opinion
of the court was to ascertain what substance this
person who is on the table who is being worked on . . .
what substance this person was under the influence of.
. . . The officer did not have probable cause to
search. [E]xigent circumstances doesn't require
probable cause to search and this case that it . . .
probable cause to search for any other crime. The
reason for the search was in the opinion of the court,
a desire to ah, obtain information that he was not
obtaining any other way. And ah, the reason for the
ah, search, the motivation in the opinion of the court
was a health safety and welfare ah, circumstance. In
light of the fact that the individual was ah,
apparently suffering some type of an overdose, there
certainly was not enough time for the officer to obtain
a search warrant, even call on the phone and obtain a
telephonic search warrant. The rational of the court
is this is exigent circumstances because of the
1

The allegations giving rise to the false information charge
occurred after Mr. Davidson was arrested and searched, [R. 74-75],
and are not relevant to the issues presented for appeal.
5

exigency of the circumstances, the officer was
authorized to conduct an arrest. Now, we've heard the
officer articulate on the witness stand also that he
was doing so because of an obstruction of justice. Our
law states even if the officer is incorrect in his
assessment, the legal assessment of the situation ah,
he's still authorized to move forward in this
particular case, he did. I . . He had . . . in the
opinion of the court, in his mind he had two basis;
Obstruction of Justice which would have justified the
search; and exigent circumstances. I rule against the
government on the obstruction of justice issue. I rule
in favor of the government on the exigency of
circumstances issue. The motion is denied.
R. 93-94.

Mr. Davidson appeals his subsequent conviction on the

basis that the District Court erred in denying his motion to
suppress.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In denying Mr. Davidson's motion to suppress, the District
Court misapplied the medical emergency exception to the warrant
requirement.

The medical emergency exception permits warrantless

searches of premises or of persons apparently in need of
immediate medical assistance where (i) the searching officer is
primarily motivated by his perceived need to render aid or
assistance, (ii) the officer had reasonable grounds to believe
that an emergency existed requiring his immediate aid or
assistance, and (iii) the officer had probable cause to believe
that the item he was looking for would be found in the place to
be searched.

The District Court first erred in applying this

exception to the search of a person not himself in need of
assistance -- the exception is limited to searches of premises or
of persons who are themselves in need of medical attention.

The

District Court also erred in upholding the search without finding
6

that Officer Hedenstrom's primary motivation for the search was
his desire to help the unconscious man.

Finally, the District

Court erroneously held that probable cause to search is not a
requirement of the medical emergency exception and consequently
erred in upholding the search after concluding that Officer
Hedenstrom did not have probable cause to search Mr. Davidson.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING
Mr. DAVIDSONS MOTION TO SUPPRESS ON THE GROUND THAT
OFFICER HEDENSTROM'S SEARCH WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE
MEDICAL EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects

M

[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."

U.S. Const., Amend. IV.

The Fourth

Amendment prohibits all unreasonable searches and seizures, and
"it is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.'"

Mincey v. Arizona 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)

(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)), accord
State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1995).

One such

recognized exception permits warrantless searches when "the
exigencies of the situation" make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable.
Mincey at 394; see also State v. Pursifull, 751 P.2d 825, 827
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("police officers [may] conduct limited,
7

warrantless entries and searches of premises in emergency
situations.").
The first formal statement of this so-called "emergency"
exception appeared in Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), where then Judge Warren Burger noted that
a warrant is not required to break down a door to enter
a burning home to rescue occupants or extinguish a
fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid
to an injured person. The need to protect or preserve
life or avoid serious injury is justification for what
would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency.
Id. at 212.

Although this doctrine initially had only limited

application to police entries into buildings, it was soon
expanded to justify a warrantless search of a person.

In Vauss

v. United States, 370 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the police found
a man unconscious on a street and while searching his pockets for
identification they discovered narcotics.

The court held the

narcotics were legally seized, stating that "[a] search of one
found in a unconscious condition is both legally permissible and
highly necessary."

Id. at 252.

Since then, numerous courts have

applied the now so-called "medical emergency" exception to uphold
warrantless searches of persons found in an unconscious or
semiconscious condition when the purpose of the search is to find
information that might enhance the prospect of providing
appropriate medical assistance.

See, e.g., United States v.

Haley, 581 F.2d 723, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1978); People v. Gomez, 40
Cal. Rptr. 616, 617-18 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); People v. Smith,
265 N.E.2d 139, 140-41 (111. 1970); State v. Auman, 386 N.W.2d
8

818, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Perez v. State, 514 S.W.2d 748,
749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).

Nonetheless, this author can find no

case in which any court has ever upheld a search of a person not
himself in need of medical treatment pursuant to the medical
emergency exception.

See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation,

Lawfulness of Search of Person or Personal Effects Under Medical
Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement, 11 A.L.R.5th 52
(1993).
Although no majority of either Utah appellate court has
found it necessary to set forth the specific requirements of the
medical emergency exception, Judge Greenwood of the Utah Court of
Appeals has recognized the exception and has set forth the
following elements that must be proved before a warrantless
search will be upheld:
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe
that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate
need for their assistance for the protection of life or
property.
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by
intent to arrest and seize evidence.
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the
area or place to be searched.
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(Greenwood, J. concurring)
N.E.2d 607, 609

(quoting People v. Mitchell, 347

(N.Y. 1976)).

Courts in other states have

established substantially similar elements of the medical
emergency exception.
(Neb.

E.g.,

State v. Resler, 306 N.W.2d 918, 923

1 9 8 1 ) ; People v. Kahn, 638 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861 (N.Y. Crim.

9

Ct. 1995) State v. Cheers, 607 N.E.2d 115, 117 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) .
A. BECAUSE MR. DAVIDSON WAS NOT HIMSELF IN NEED OF
ASSISTANCE AT THE TIME HE WAS SEARCHED, THE DISTRICT
COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SEARCH PURSUANT TO THE
MEDICAL EMERGENCY EXCEPTION
As stated above, searches conducted without a warrant are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
Mincey at 390; Katz at 357; Shoulderblade at 294.

These

exceptions have been carefully drawn and jealously guarded.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979); State v. Ashe, 745
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

From these general principles

necessarily follows the rule that exceptions to the search
warrant requirement have not been and should not be created or
expanded in the absence of a compelling reason to do so.

Cf.

State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802, 812 (Or. 1983) (en banc) (declining
to expand emergency exception to allow warrantless entry into
home to "neutralize" area after emergency had dissipated) (cited
with approval in State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 16-17 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) ) .
Although the medical emergency exception has already been
expanded to allow warrantless searches of individuals who are in
need of immediate medical assistance, it cannot justify a
warrantless search of a healthy bystander.

To explain this

proposition, it is first necessary to recognize the extent of
protection the Fourth Amendment affords persons whom police
officers desire to "frisk."

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
10

the Supreme Court discussed the reasons for this protection,
first describing the nature of a "frisk" as follows:
11

[T] he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every
portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must
be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline
and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and
entire surface of the legs down to the feet."
Id. at 17, n.13 (quoting Prior & Martin, Searching and Disarming
Criminals, 45 J. Crim L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954)).

Recognizing the

highly intrusive nature of such a "frisk", the Court stated:
It is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure
performed in public by a policeman while the citizen
stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands
raised, is a petty indignity. It is a serious
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment,
and it is not to be undertaken lightly.
Id. at 16-17 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
Against this backdrop, this court must decide whether to broaden
the medical emergency exception to uphold Officer Hedenstrom's
search of Mr. Davidson.2
The medical emergency exception arose from the recognition
that the need to protect life or avoid serious injury is
generally paramount to the right of privacy.

People v. Wright,

804 P.2d 866, 869-70 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).

When viewed in

isolation, this single statement of policy would appear to
support expansion of the medical emergency exception to searches
2

While the record is silent as to the nature and extent of
the search at issue in this case, we can presume that it was more
invasive than the limited "frisk" described in Terry.
Officer
Hedenstrom thought he was searching Mr. Davidson incident to his
arrest for obstructing justice -- a search which would clearly
extend beyond the subject's outer clothing and into his pockets and
other areas not easily accessible.
11

of healthy bystanders.

However, a close examination of the

development and historical application of the exception suggest
two additional factors, both of which weigh against such
expansion: (i) an unconscious or semiconscious person in need of
immediate medical assistance has a lesser expectation of privacy
vis-a-vis a police officer desiring to help that person than a
healthy bystander would have; and (ii) one who does not or cannot
object to being searched is afforded less protection under the
Fourth Amendment than one who does object.
First, it is clear that one who is unconscious or
semiconscious and is in need of immediate medical assistance has
a lesser expectation of privacy vis-a-vis a police officer
desiring to help that person than a healthy bystander would have.
We can presume that most people would readily give up some degree
of privacy as a condition precedent to receiving necessary
medical care.

In fact, it cannot be doubted that millions of

people in this country give up some degree of privacy every day
as they seek medical care, whether that care is necessary or
merely preventive.

For example, a routine physical checkup

usually requires the patient to remove his or her clothing and to
submit to a "hands-on" examination by a doctor or nurse.
Patients under these circumstances have a lesser expectation of
privacy than people not seeking medical care.
Moreover, this phenomenon is not limited to those seeking
the care of a medical professional.

For example, an unconscious

person just rescued from drowning in a swimming pool would
12

certainly not object to receiving mouth-to-mouth resuscitation
from a lifeguard if that treatment were necessary to save the
person's life.

Similarly, a man choking in a restaurant would

naturally consent to the waiter's performing the heimlich
maneuver.

And an individual with a heart condition might ask a

stranger to search his coat pockets for medication necessary to
alleviate severe chest pain.

In these and other situations, the

person in need of medical assistance has a lesser expectation of
privacy than his or her healthy counterpart.
The medical emergency exception allows searches of persons
in need of medical assistance in part because those persons have
a lesser expectation of privacy than persons not in such need.
Like the patient seeking a doctor's care, the drowning swimmer
receiving mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, the choking man receiving
the heimlich maneuver, and the individual asking a stranger to
find his heart medicine, an unconscious or semiconscious person
in need of immediate medical care would generally not object to a
police officer's careful search of the person for something that
might facilitate the necessary treatment.
This lesser-expectation-of-privacy rationale explains why
the courts have not generally hesitated to apply the medical
emergency exception to searches of persons in need of medical
assistance.

It is well established that the degree of protection

the Fourth Amendment provides corresponds to the subject's
expectation of privacy.

See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471

U.S. 386, 390-93 (1985) (discussing lesser-expectation-of-privacy
13

rationale for automobile exception to search warrant
requirement).

A police officer's search of a person in need of

medical assistance in order to gather information necessary to
provide that assistance is not only necessary for the
preservation of life or limb, but it is also likely to be exactly
what the person searched would have expected and wanted.

The

significance of the lesser-expectation-of-privacy rationale under
these circumstances is underscored by the fact that no court has
ever applied the medical emergency exception to a search of a
healthy bystander who's expectation of privacy has not been
diminished.

See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation,

Lawfulness of Search of Person or Personal Effects Under Medical
Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement, 11 A.L.R.5th 52
(1993) .
The second factor weighing against further expansion of the
medical emergency exception to excuse the search of Mr. Davidson
is the general rule that one who asserts his right to privacy is
afforded greater protection under the Fourth Amendment than one
who does not.

See, e.g., State v. Roister, 869 P.2d 993, 995

(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated by search of package in which defendant had not
asserted his right to privacy).

In a typical application of the

medical emergency exception, the person to be searched is not
physically capable of either consenting to or objecting to the
search.

In contrast, Mr. Davidson strenuously objected.

To further develop this distinction, it is helpful to
14

R. 86.

consider the permissible scope of a police investigation of a car
accident in which the driver was rendered unconscious.

First,

there is no question that Utah law allows a police officer to
obtain a blood sample from the unconscious driver.

State v.

Wight, 765 P. 2d 12, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) .3 However, if the
driver were capable of objecting to the blood draw and did, in
fact, object, it is equally clear that the driver's blood could
not be drawn.

State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307, 308-09 (Utah 1968).

Similarly, courts have held that a police officer may search an
unconscious person pursuant to the medical emergency exception,
but they have not applied that exception to uphold searches of
persons who were capable of and actually objected to the search.
See, e. g., Wright, 804 P.2d at 870 (medical emergency exception
did not justify search of defendant's purse at time when
defendant was conscious and "fully able to disclose information
that might be useful in her diagnosis and treatment."); See
generally Bateman.4
3

A blood draw constitutes a search subject to the same Fourth
Amendment constraints as Officer Hedenstrom's search of Mr.
Davidson. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
4

Plaintiff/Appellee Salt Lake City (the "City") might attack
this analogy, arguing that the taking of a blood sample from an
unconscious driver is allowed by Utah's Implied Consent Law, Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, pursuant to which drivers in the State of
Utah are deemed to have consented to such chemical tests. The City
will suggest that the analogy does not hold because the Implied
Consent Law applies only to drivers, not to others who are
unconscious and in need of medical attention.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that implied
consent "is nothing more than a legal fiction . . . indulged to
avoid possible constitutional difficulties in requiring an alcohol
test." Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1337-38 (Utah 1979). Thus, the
Implied Consent Law reflects a policy judgment that it is more
15

Carrying the analogy even further, although Utah law allows
a police officer to take a blood sample from the unconscious
driver, the officer cannot take a blood sample from an uninjured
passenger in the same vehicle.

A healthy bystander such as

Mr. Davidson is comparable to this uninjured passenger.

In both

situations, the subject could certainly agree to provide the
information the officer is looking for, voluntarily submit to a
blood draw, or consent to a search.

However, just as no law or

policy would allow a police officer to require the uninjured
passenger to submit to a blood draw, this court should not
authorize the search of a healthy bystander in the absence of his
or her consent.
In the present case, Officer Hedenstrom testified that he
did not ask for Mr. Davidson's consent to search,5 and he does
not remember whether or not Mr. Davidson objected to the search.

important to detect and subsequently convict drunk drivers than to
protect the privacy right of drivers who are unable to object to a
blood draw. But the fact that the Implied Consent Law does not
authorize the taking of a blood sample from a conscious driver over
the driver's objection, Cruz, 446 P. 2d at 308-09, also reflects an
important policy judgment: that the need to gather evidence of
drunk driving does not prevail over the privacy right of one who
actually objects to the search.
Similarly, applying the medical emergency exception to the
search of an unconscious person reflects the policy judgment that
the need to preserve life and limb is paramount to an unconscious
person's right of privacy. However, following the countervailing
policy of the Implied Consent Law, police officers should not be
allowed to conduct a search over the specific and strenuous
objection of the person to be searched. Thus, the analogy holds.
5

Indeed, Officer Hedenstrom would have had no reason to ask
for Mr. Davidson's consent -- the officer thought he was conducting
a search incident to arrest which he could have done even over Mr.
Davidson's objection.
16

R. 83.

However, Mr. Davidson testified that he specifically

objected to being searched, to which Officer Hedenstrom responded
"We're not asking your permission."

R. 86.

In the face of such

an objection, Officer Hedenstrom should not have proceeded with
the search and the medical emergency exception should not apply.
In short, despite the strong public policy favoring the
medical emergency exception, the countervailing policy of
protecting the privacy rights of healthy bystanders who clearly
object to being searched must prevail.

The legislature and the

courts have abided by this judgment in the context of drunk
driving investigations and this court should do the same.

For

these reasons, this court should decline to expand the medical
emergency exception to uphold the search of Mr. Davidson and
should therefore reverse the decision of the trial court.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING OFFICER
HEDENSTROM7S SEARCH AFTER FINDING THAT THE SEARCH WAS
PARTIALLY MOTIVATED BY THE OFFICER'S INCORRECT BELIEF
THAT HE WAS CONDUCTING A SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL
ARREST.
As Judge Greenwood indicated in her concurring opinion in
Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, one requirement of the medical emergency
exception is that the search was not primarily motivated by the
officer's intent to arrest and seize evidence.

Id. at 550.

In

the present case, the District Court erred in upholding Officer
Hedenstrom's search of Mr. Davidson without considering this
requirement.

In fact, the District Court found that the officer

was at least partially motivated by the "standard procedure"
under which an arrested person is searched "for weapons and
17

anything else."

R. 74.

Although the court found that Officer

Hedenstrom did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Davidson,
the court upheld the search.

R. 93-94.

In Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975), the court
expounded upon the importance of identifying the searching
officer's primary motivation for the search.

There, the court

stated:
[P]olice officers have a customary duty to protect the
lives and welfare of the citizens at large. . . .
However, this duty may not be used as a subterfuge for
invading an individual's constitutional rights.
Id. at 842.
In Schraff, a police officer searched the defendant's wallet
for identification and found drugs.

At the suppression hearing,

the officer testified that he wanted the identification for two
reasons: (i) the defendant may have committed a criminal act and
"it's routine procedure to identify" suspects; and (ii) the
defendant was apparently under the influence of drugs and it was
unknown whether "he's subsequently going to need medical
attention."

Id. at 844.

The court found that the search did not

fall within the medical emergency exception because its purpose
was not solely to render aid, but also to investigate suspected
criminal activity.

The court distinguished other cases in which

searches were upheld pursuant to the medical emergency exception,
stating that "[i]n the other cases, the officers claimed that
their only motivation was that of rendering aid to an injured
person."

Id.

The facts in the present case are very similar to those in
18

Schraff.

Officer Hedenstrom testified that he did not search

Mr. Davidson until he had decided to place him under arrest and
handcuff him because he refused to answer all of the officer's
questions.

R. 74.

When asked why Mr. Davidson was searched,

Officer Hedenstrom answered "It's a standard procedure when
someone is arrested to search them for weapons and anything
else."

[Id.]

Then, almost as an afterthought, Officer

Hedenstrom indicated that he was "hoping to find the drug
paraphernalia that this man had overdosed on that could help
him."

[Id.]
The District Court interpreted this conflicting testimony to

mean that Officer Hedenstrom was motivated to search Mr. Davidson
by two factors.

The court stated:

Now, we've heard the officer articulate on the witness
stand also that he was doing so because of an
obstruction of justice. Our law states even if the
officer is incorrect in his assessment, the legal
assessment of the situation ah, he's still authorized
to move forward in this particular case, he did. I ..
He had . . . in the opinion of the court, in his mind
he had two basis: Obstruction of Justice which would
have justified the search; and exigent circumstances.
I rule against the government on the obstruction of
justice issue. I rule in favor of the government on
the exigency of circumstances issue.
R. 94.

Although the District Court attempted to reconcile

Officer Hedenstrom's conflicting motivations, it failed to
categorize these motivations as primary or secondary.

Instead,

the court simply held that because one of the two reasons for the
search was to help the unconscious man, the search was justified.
However, the medical emergency exception requires more; the court
must find that the primary motivation for the search was not to
19

arrest and seize evidence.
case requires reversal.

The absence of such a finding in this

See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784

n.26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[w]here specific findings are
required, failure to enter such findings is reversible error
unless the facts in the record 'are clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment'")
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983));
accord State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Ordinarily, a trial court's failure to make findings on all
issues necessary to support its judgment requires that the case
be remanded for the trial court to make additional findings.
Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622
(Utah 1989) . However, remand for additional findings is not
necessary if the evidence in the record is not in dispute and the
appellate court can fairly and properly resolve the case on the
record before it.

World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency

Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 262 (Utah 1994) (citing Flying Diamond).
In this case, Officer Hedenstrom's testimony clearly
indicates that his primary motivation for searching Mr. Davidson
was to comply with "standard procedure when someone is arrested
to search them for weapons and anything else."

R. 74.

Although

the officer probably did want to help the unconscious man if he
could have, the record cannot support a finding that this was his
primary motivation.

Because the record could not support this

essential finding as a matter of law, remand for additional
findings is not necessary.
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C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT OFFICER
HEDENSTROM'S SEARCH WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE MEDICAL
EMERGENCY EXCEPTION WITHOUT ALSO CONCLUDING THAT
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO BELIEVE THAT Mr. DAVIDSON WAS
IN POSSESSION OF DRUGS OR DRUG PARAPHERNALIA.
The final element of the medical emergency exception
requires that the searching officer had "a reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the
area or place to be searched."

Yoder at 550.

In this case, not

only did the District Court fail to reach this conclusion, the
court actually stated just the opposite conclusion: "The officer
did not have probable cause to search."

R. 93.6

Nonetheless,

the court upheld the search pursuant to the medical emergency
exception.

Because the City could not establish the requisite

nexus between the emergency and the person searched, the District
Court erred in upholding the search pursuant to the medical
emergency exception.
CONCLUSION
The District Court misapplied the medical emergency
exception in upholding Officer Hedenstrom's search of
6

In fact, this is the only logical conclusion the District
Court could have drawn in light of the facts presented. Officer
Hedenstrom testified that the only reasons he had to suspect that
a search of Mr. Davidson might be helpful to the unconscious man
were: (i) Mr. Davidson was present in the apartment with the
unconscious man when Officer Hedenstrom arrived at the scene; and
(ii) Mr. Davidson refused to answer all of the officer's questions.
R. 80-82. However, Officer Hedenstrom did not see Mr. Davidson in
possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia prior to the search and
Mr. Davidson made no statements prior to the search which would
have supported a suspicion that he was in possession of anything
that might have been helpful in treating the unconscious man. The
conclusion is inescapable: Officer Hedenstrom did not have a
reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to believe that he
would have found anything useful in Mr. Davidson's possession.
21

Mr. Davidson.

Accordingly, Mr. Davidson's conviction should be

reversed, the case should be remanded for Mr. Davidson to
withdraw his guilty plea, and the District Court should be
instructed that the evidence discovered pursuant to Officer
Hedenstrom's illegal search may not be used against Mr. Davidson
at trial.
SUBMITTED this Jj^-bt day of February, 1999.

DAVIlf S. KOTTLER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM B

Burden in a motion to suppress is on the prosecution to show why it was legal.
In this case I haven't heard any cases cited to show an exception to the warrant
requirement. It's well established that the search, I mean in this case it's clear,
the search was improper unless it fits within the valid exception to the warrant
requirement.

It's the City's burden to explain to the court what specific

established exception to the warrant requirement applies and they haven't done
that, they haven't cited a case, exit and circumstances by itself is not enough and
they got the burden, it's not me and all I'm saying is that it's not enough. I don't
have to go out and find a case that says exigent circumstances is not enough. I
(inaudible) representation to the court but we haven't heard anything to the
contrary and we're not looking at what's ah, common sense or whether any ah,
port of equity would do in this kind of situation. We're following the constitution
and clearly there's not an exception to the warrant requirement that applies here.
Okay. In this case the court denies the defense motion ah, the rational of the
court is that there was...the officer did have exigent circumstances here. My
understanding of exigent circumstances is that the warrant requirement does not
apply when an officer has exigent circumstances when health or safety or welfare
is involved. In this case, the officers motivation and the opinion of the court was
to ascertain what substance this person who is on the table who is being worked
on...what substance this person was under the influence of.

What were the

conditions, the characteristics that may have predicated or led up to the particular
event. The officer did not have probable cause to search exigent circumstances
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doesn't require probable cause to search and this case that it...probable cause to
search for any other crime. The reason for the search was in the opinion of the
court, a desire to ah, obtain information that he was not obtaining any other way.
And ah, the reason for the ah, search, the motivation in the opinion of the court
was a health safety and welfare ah, circumstance. In light of the fact that the
individual was ah, apparently suffering some type of an overdose, there certainly
was not enough time for the officer to obtain a search warrant, even call on the
phone and obtain a telephonic search warrant. The rational of the court is this
is exigent circumstances because of the exigency of the circumstances, the officer
was authorized to conduct an arrest. Now, we've heard the officer articulate on
the witness stand also that he was doing so because of an obstruction of justice.
Our law states even if the officer is incorrect in his assessment, the legal
assessment of the situation ah, he's still authorized to move forward in this
particular case, he did. I...He had...in the opinion of the court, in his mind he
had two basis; Obstruction of Justice which would have justified the search; and
exigent circumstances. I rule against the government on the obstruction of justice
issue. I rule

in favor of the government on the exigency of circumstances issue.

The motion is denied. At this time, ah, do you want the matter set for trial, or
how do you wish to proceed?
Umm. Your Honor, actually we could set the matter for ummm. I think we've
requested a jury trial. I did have another Motion that I would like to file. I
would like to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance concealing identity
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